South Sudan’s fragile transition threatens elections

South Sudan’s fragile transition is increasingly shaped by forces beyond its borders that drive illicit arms flows into the country, writes Oluwole Ojewale, senior researcher, Central Africa Observatory, Institute of Security Studies (ISS). Ojewale says South Sudan’s Government has fixed December 2026 for national elections, which many citizens and international observers hope can foster peace if conducted freely and fairly. ‘However, such hope rests on a fragile foundation. Long-standing divisions define the country’s political landscape. Power struggles over unilateral government amendments of the 2018 peace agreement, Vice-President Riek Machar’s continued detention and increasing militarisation threaten to scupper the polls, as they have done twice before.’ He notes that new risks emerged recently when the leader of the South Sudan People’s Movement/Army General Stephen Buay Rolnyang declared his movement “ready for confrontation”. He labelled the upcoming polls as “nothing more than a calculated façade”, saying it was “legally and practically untenable to claim that genuine, credible, and democratic elections can be organised within seven months”.’ Ojewale believes that another major threat to a smooth democratic transition is the illicit flow of arms into the country. ‘The problem has long been a destabilising factor in South Sudan. In 2018, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo preventing the supply, sale or transfer of arms to the country. But the embargo, which is still in place, has not stemmed illicit inflows.’

Ojewale states that although the 2013-2018 civil war formally ended, violence in the country has become a war of attrition, with frequent localised conflicts threatening state-building, civilian safety and efforts to hold elections. ‘Civil society actors in Juba said elections could ‘only be held in [a] few urban centres, considering … that most rural areas are grossly inaccessible and overtaken by rebels and various armed groups. These groups, they said, sustain themselves through the illicit supply of weapons.’ Ojewale notes in the ISS analysis that since around 80% of the country’s population (9.6m people) live in rural areas, elections could fail to reflect the views of millions of eligible voters, undermining the legitimacy of the result ‘But there is a regional dimension to South Sudan’s challenges that must be recognised and included in efforts to stabilise the country. The ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces in neighbouring Sudan has enabled the flow of illicit arms into South Sudan and the recruitment of South Sudanese fighters by the RSF. Both sides have also smuggled weapons to their bases through South Sudan, exacerbating illegal cross-border arms trading.’ He says the 2025 Global Organised Crime Index confirms the role of transnational networks in South Sudan’s continued arms smuggling. ‘Demand for weapons is driven by ongoing conflict, not only in Sudan, but also in neighbouring Ethiopia, the Central African Republic (CAR) and DRC). Rising insecurity in the Karamoja Cluster, linked mostly to livestock rustling, is also a factor. These regional dynamics reconfigure local power balances in South Sudan, embolden armed groups and erode the already weak peace infrastructure.’

Ojewale feels that South Sudan is, however, not just a recipient of spillover violence. ‘The country’s deepening economic crisis, which has left state security forces unpaid for over a year, is reportedly driving a surge in illegal arms trading. Poorly paid soldiers become vulnerable to the allure of weapons trading. The country also serves as a transit corridor for the illicit economy. In March 2024, several hundred kilograms of gold reportedly produced in South Darfur were transported through Wau and Juba in South Sudan before being shipped out of Africa.’ Ojewale concludes in the ISS analysis that stabilising South Sudan requires moving beyond inward-looking solutions towards a broader regional security approach. ‘A comprehensive strategy to halt the illicit flow of weapons is essential. As such, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the AU could curb illicit arms flows into South Sudan by establishing joint cross-border task forces linking South Sudan to Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, the DRC and CAR. The proposed units must draw from national customs, border police and military ….the reality is that without shrinking demand for weapons, supply-side controls will have limited impact.’

Full analysis in ISS Today