How kidnappings in the Sahel are changing

Kidnapping for ransom has a long history in the west African Sahel, but the 'industry' is now seeing a significant shift, write Alexander M Laskaris and Olivier Walther in The Conversation. They say over the decades kidnapping became an industry in the Sahel as governments were willing to pay financial and political ransoms even if they denied it publicly. ‘In 1979, a rebel group led by Chad’s future President Hissène Habré kidnapped a French archaeologist and a German medical doctor in the north of the country. The kidnappers asked for the release of political prisoners, among other demands.’ This industry, the two writers state, fuelled the expansion of jihadist groups from Algeria to the Sahel (south of the Sahara) between the early 2000s and mid-2010s. ‘The most spectacular of these kidnappings was the abduction of 32 European tourists in 2003 ... by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in the Algerian Sahara. A €5m ransom was reportedly paid for the hostages. Using conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, they say their findings suggest that the kidnapping industry has experienced a major shift. ‘We discovered that most of the victims of kidnappings for ransom were westerners until the end of the 2010s. Since then violent extremist organisations have turned to local civilians. Both western and local hostages represent lucrative resources that ultimately fuel insurgencies in the west African Sahel.’ According to Laskaris and Walther, armed groups have learned that seizing a western hostage is a low-risk and high-reward proposition. ‘It leads to financial gain and political accommodation. The exact amount of money paid is difficult to assess due to the opacity of the negotiations and the number of intermediaries involved.'

'An estimated $125 m was paid by European countries to liberate hostages captured by al-Qaeda and its affiliates in this region from 2008 to 2014. These resources have fuelled the international development, training and arms purchases of armed groups. For example, in October 2025, the United Arab Emirates allegedly paid a $50m ransom. They also allegedly delivered military hardware to al-Qaeda-affiliated militants for the release of Emirati hostages in Mali.’ They say the revenues generated from ransom payments have facilitated the development of alliances between militant groups and local leaders. ‘They have also made the recruitment of young combatants from Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso easier for extremist organisations, by offering significant financial incentives.’ Laskaris and Walther note in The Conversation analysis that in the past decade, the number of foreigners living or travelling in the Sahel has plummeted. ‘Due to terrorism and political unrest, travel to the region is strongly discouraged by western countries. Jihadist militants have therefore turned to local targets and started abducting a growing number of civilians from the region. …Abductions and forced disappearances have experienced a twenty-fold increase since Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed in 2017. Kidnappings tend to occur both along major transport corridors and in rural areas. There, jihadist groups have implemented a predatory economy based on looting and ransoming civilians.’

They say in the central Sahel, this kidnapping economy has spread to most rural areas. ‘This includes the south of the Wagadou forest in Mali to the W National Park at the border between Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger. The brutal local economics of kidnap for ransom is also vibrant in the Lake Chad region. Although the kidnapping of westerners is, on a per capita basis, far more lucrative in the Sahel, these groups are doing a brisk business of kidnapping civilians.’ The question of whether hostage situations should be resolved by paying a ransom depends on the parties involved, state Laskaris and Walther in The Conversation. ‘For Sahelian governments, acceding to ransom demands weakens their political position and provides material support for those who threaten them. The same applies to foreigners in the Sahel – relief workers, missionaries, business people, tourists – for whom every ransom paid makes their position more precarious. For western governments responsive to family, media and political pressure, however, bringing hostages home via ransom is always the easiest solution. Media coverage focuses on joyful reunions, not moral hazard. Laskaris and Walther say left unresolved is the tension between the prohibition on paying ransom to terrorist organisations and the reality that, for kidnapping victims and their families, the best response is to pay. ‘Given the vastness of the Sahel and the lack of any effective security response, caving to ransom demands is the best hope for a successful resolution. At the same time, however, one should also not be afraid to state the obvious: their joy (families) leads inevitably to another westerner’s or African’s trauma.'

Full analysis on The Conversation site