SADC peace-keeping role battered after DRC withdrawal

South Africa’s disastrous deployment to the eastern DRC has come to an abrupt and ignominious end, with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa grossly misrepresenting the situation on the ground, writes Stephanie Wolters in a Daily Maverick analysis. Wolters says Ramaphosa suggested that an imminent resolution of the conflict justified the withdrawal of the SADC Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). ‘Nothing could be further from the truth: the situation in eastern DRC today is substantially worse than it was when SAMIDRC deployed in late 2023. SADC (Southern African Development Community) appeared to have understood that when it extended SAMIDRC’s mandate in late November 2024, on the basis of “concern at the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the country”. Today there is no ceasefire in place while fighting between M23 and the Congolese army continues, and the M23 continues to capture new territory. Negotiations between the various parties are stalled while the conflict continues to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and refugee flows – with an estimated seven m i l l i o n people displaced by the conflict in the past three years.’ Wolters points out that in this context, the SADC’s decision on 13 March 2025 to withdraw the SAMIDRC force from the eastern DRC has significant negative ramifications for South Africa and SADC’s standing as a player in African peacekeeping, while it also leaves the DRC scrambling for African allies at a critical moment in the ongoing conflict with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group.

‘SADC had been relatively hands-off throughout the first three years of the conflict and few expected it to step into the breach opened by East African Community Regional Force’s (EACRF ) earlier departure.’ Wolter’s notes in the Daily Maverick that the official line from South African officials was that the deployment to the DRC was necessary under SADC’s own defence and security pact, which requires the body to come to the defence of a member state if it is attacked. ‘Many were sceptical that this was the full story – not least because the SADC engagement started three years into the conflict, but also because the ANC’s history of corruption scandals, coupled with the DRC’s mineral wealth and own corruption issues, had everyone suspecting that a hidden pot of gold was the real motivation for the deployment.’ But, South Africa has always considered the DRC to be part of its sphere of influence, and it has a long history of diplomatic and military engagement in the country. When the first M23 crisis erupted in 2012, Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa– who also formed SAMIDRC – fielded the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which deployed in eastern DRC in 2013 under UN leadership, and with UN financing.’ By that point, international diplomatic pressure on Rwandan President Paul Kagame had weakened the M23, and the FIB was able to relatively easily defeat the armed group. In the past 12 years, the FIB has been deployed along the DRC’s eastern borders with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, where the success of its operations has been mitigated.’

Wolters states that the nature of the SAMIDRC deployment in 2023 is substantially different from that of the FIB in 2013. ‘First, the troop-contributing countries, as well as SADC and the DRC, bear the costs of the deployment, estimated in 2023 to be $500m a year. Second, SAMIDRC is not part of a neutral UN peacekeeping force, but is rather a stand-alone regional peace enforcement force deployed to protect a member state. SAMIDRC had an offensive mandate to go after the M23 rebels, and SADC’s analysis clearly recognised Rwanda’s role in supporting the M23, and the presence in eastern DRC of Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops fighting alongside the M23.’ Wolter says although Rwanda’s role has been established since 2022 by the UN and numerous other international organisations, as well as the intelligence agencies of several countries, Kigali denies its support of the M23 as well as the presence of its troops in eastern DRC. ‘The fact that SADC openly recognised the role played by Rwanda provided the DRC with significant diplomatic support at a time when many African and Western nations, and even the AU, were reluctant to speak plainly about Rwanda’s involvement. The context of the conflict is also different: the M23 first re-emerged in 2021, and the conflict is now in its fourth year. In 2012, international actors exerted pressure on Kagame within months of the outbreak of the conflict, which meant that it was contained, and that Rwandan support was withdrawn quickly, leaving the M23 a largely spent force. In this crisis, it has taken international actors much longer to react, emboldening the M23 and its Rwandan backers, whose military strength remains undiminished.’ Wolters points out in the Daily Maverick analysis that whatever SADC and South Africa’s intentions, it was clear from the outset that SADC and South Africa had underestimated and even misread the situation.

Full Daily Maverick analysis