Niger’s failed coup a warning to Sahel leaders

Niger’s military regime, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, faced its most significant challenge on 29 August since coming to power in 2023, notes Salah Ben Hammou, a postdoctoral research associate, Rice University, in The Conversation. ‘The episode came after a year in which jihadist violence repeatedly reached Niger’s capital. But this time the challenge came from within the armed forces themselves. More specifically, the alleged involvement of younger, junior officers and frontline soldiers exposes a vulnerability for military juntas.’ Hammou believes that Niger’s recent coup is part of a dangerous feedback loop when military rule meets protracted insurgency. ‘As juntas centralise power while failing to improve security, they can create discontent within the very institution that sustains their rule. Lower-ranking officers bear the costs of an unresolved conflict while having little influence over how it is fought. Battlefield frustration can become political discontent within the ranks.’ According to Hammou, similar pressures have emerged in Burkina Faso and Mali, where coup leaders have struggled to deliver on their security promises. ‘The problem can become self-reinforcing. The longer insurgencies persist, the harder it becomes for juntas to maintain cohesion within the armed forces. Bottom of Form Recent events suggest that Niger’s security crisis has generated precisely this kind of pressure within the military. More broadly, it suggests that the wars that helped bring the Sahel’s juntas to power may threaten their hold on it.’

Hammou says when democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown in 2023, Tchiani, his former commander of the Presidential Guard, blamed the government for corruption and its failure to contain insurgency involving Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). ‘His seizure of power, he argued, was necessary to save Niger from a “gradual and inevitable demise”. Three years later, those words resonate. The security situation under military rule has steadily deteriorated, with JNIM and ISSP expanding the scope of their attacks. Civilian and military casualties have surged since the 2023 coup, approaching 2 000 in 2025 alone. Hammou states in The Conversation analysis that in 2025, Tichiani formalised his grip by becoming transitional President, effectively extending military rule from the 2023 coup through at least 2030. ‘Simultaneously, political parties have been fully dissolved. High-ranking officers with personal ties to Tchiani have ascended to politically sensitive positions and gained influence across the bureaucracy. The military’s consolidation of power does not mean that the junta commands sustained support across the ranks. Coups, like the one in 2023, can initially attract broad support, but that support can erode when new rulers fail to deliver. This is especially relevant for lower-ranking officers, who bear the brunt of a worsening insurgency.’ He believes Niger had already shown signs of this growing disconnect. ‘Earlier that year, soldiers at a garrison in Termit mutinied over poor living conditions, shortages of critical supplies and a perceived lack of support from the capital. When senior officers flew in to negotiate, the soldiers detained them, a clear breach of the chain of command.’

Hammou points out that the August coupists included frontline soldiers deployed in Niger’s south-west, where ISSP has inflicted some of the heaviest losses on the armed forces. He says Niger is hardly alone in confronting this dilemma.’ Military officers in Mali and Burkina Faso, fellow members of the Alliance of Sahel States, came to power promising to resolve the security crises that had undermined their civilian predecessors. He writes in The Conversation analysis that the juntas have also changed how they fight these wars. ‘Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have withdrawn from the regional economic body Ecowas, abandoning an important regional framework for security co-operation, while turning increasingly to Russia and its Africa Corps for military support. The new partnership has helped the regimes protect themselves from challenges, but has done little to contain the insurgencies. This is the feedback loop facing these regimes. Prolonged insurgencies place growing pressure on military leaders who come to power promising to solve them. Increasingly personalised rule gives junior officers and frontline soldiers little influence over how the war is conducted despite the fact that they bear the greatest cost. Dissatisfaction moves up the chain of command, creating incentives for soldiers to challenge the leadership.’

Full analysis in The Conversation