Ethiopia votes amid political fragmentation

Ethiopia’s general election today (Monday) will take place amid armed conflicts and political fragmentation. This has raised questions over voter participation and legitimacy and the future of the country’s multi-ethnic federal system. Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country and a key regional actor in the Horn of Africa. Redie Bereketeab, who researches state- and nation-building, identity and nationalism in the Horn of Africa, unpacks the 2026 election in an analysis in The Conversation. Bereketeab says Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party remains by far the strongest political force nationally. ‘The party controls most federal and regional state institutions. The incumbent faces more than 45 opposition parties that are contesting the election. But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion. This partly stems from widespread restrictions on opposition parties, such as arbitrary arrests and preventing meetings. This has been documented by rights groups, including the US-based Freedom House. Most of the parties face organisational, financial and security constraints too. Others have limited regional reach.’ According to Bereketeab some of the country’s most influential political actors are either weakened, fragmented or excluded altogether. ‘So, there is little uncertainty over who will govern after the votes have been counted. Instead, the key election issue is whether the process itself will be regarded as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate across Ethiopia’s highly diverse regions and political constituencies.’

Bereketeab points out that the elections will take place against the backdrop of multiple overlapping conflicts. ‘These have displaced millions and weakened state authority in several parts of the country. Insecurity is expected to limit voting in large areas. The central question will be how much of the population can realistically participate. In the north-western Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has continued since 2023. Armed conflict persists in parts of Oromia to the south, involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In both regions, insecurity, displacement and communications restrictions have complicated political organising and voter mobilisation. Elections are therefore unlikely to be organised across large areas.’ Bereketeab states in The Conversation that in the northern region of Tigray, large-scale fighting formally ended in 2022, nevertheless, unresolved disputes over territory, political representation and the return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. ‘The fragile post-war environment is further complicated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front being barred from contesting the election. The party’s legal status was cancelled by the National Election Board of Ethiopia in May 2025 for failure to hold a national assembly within the legally mandated period. In addition, tensions within the movement have produced rival factions.’ The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy, notes Bereketeab. ‘But with Tigray not participating, as well as major parts of Amhara and Oromia, that legitimacy will be in doubt.'

'What are the other factors shaping the election? The economy is one main factor. Ethiopia has high rural poverty, a mounting public debt burden and the economic, social and humanitarian consequences of years of conflict and displacement. Deteriorating economic conditions could fuel further internal unrest and strengthen the position of armed movements in parts of the country.’ Bereketeab believes regional tensions could also influence the political atmosphere and security environment surrounding the election. ‘Relations with Eritrea have deteriorated sharply in recent months amid disputes over Red Sea access and growing fears of renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Ethiopia’s involvement in the wider Sudan conflict is another source of tension. An escalation with Eritrea or further spillover from Sudan could intensify nationalist rhetoric and divert political attention away from domestic reform. It could further complicate already fragile security conditions during the electoral period.’ Bereketeab feels that without broader political dialogue and efforts to address the underlying conflicts, the election risks reinforcing divisions. ‘A better approach would be to resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate. There is scope for the European Union and the US to play a constructive role. They have the capacity to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.’ Bereketeab concludes in The Conversation analysis that however, there may be little appetite in Brussels or Washington for such moves.

Full analysis on The Conversation site